not necessarily mean analyzing specific performances or recordings at all," but considering instead the way in which performance as a phenomenon has been "scripted" into the work ("B").' In other words, musical works themselves take heed of the "performance network"-the channels between composer, notation, performer, material realization, and listener (ISO, p. 5).
Meticulous as it can be, much of this writing nonetheless misses a mark not so easy to define. And whatever its vague outer limits, that mark has a dense center that has to do with musical performance's strangeness, its unearthly as well as its earthy qualities, and its resemblance to magic shows and circuses. Because instrumental virtuosity or operatic singing, like magic itself, can appear to be the accomplishment of the impossible, performers at that level appear superhuman to their audiences and inspire worship or hysteria. Yet musical performance challenges notions of autonomy by staging the performer's servitude, even automatism, and upends assumptions about human subjectivity by invoking mechanism: human bodies wired to notational prescriptions. And, despite all that, it has been discussed as if it were an unremarkable fact of civilized life, and neither love nor fear is given much play." Opera criticism offers a striking exception, yet its focus is not on performances per se but on opera singers' voices as erotic objects, with listener rapture subsequently transcribed as prose, in a style David Levin has dubbed academic "Neo-Lyricism."'2 Musical performance on the whole, however, has been seen, analyzed, and acknowledged, but not always listened to, and if the pleasure given by operatic singing has had a sharp profile, the consolations and disturbances attendant upon musical performance in general have not. Maybe the untroubled prose styles are analogous to ritual behavior while concert-or operagoing is a form of command and a defensive stance. But there is something about the objective mode that seems to protest too much, bypassing the uncanny qualities that are always waiting nearby in trying to domesticate what remains nonetheless wild. 11. There are exceptions; Goehr and Cumming are exemplary in this regard. In "Acts of Recall" on the other hand, Dunsby uses less objective "poeticised" language only at the end (p. 16). In this case, the very self-consciousness that brackets that language as "poeticised"-that worries about the change in tone, calls it a fantasy--shows how ingrained the clinical voice can be, as the only proper voice. Actual live, unrecorded performances are for the same reason almost universally excluded from performance studies; they, too, remain wild.
Performance has been subsidiary as well in the sense that when real performances (invariably recordings) are cited they are often being summoned for an endorsement. Thus some performer's rendition, some director's staging, is deemed revelatory when it corresponds to one's own or some historically sanctioned reading of the work, but ill-conceived or offbeat when failing to do so. Ask these questions when musical performances are discussed: Is a sonic and visual reality, all its physical force and sensual power, being hauled in to provide a pedigree for a conclusion about meaning or form, with the abstraction-the musical work per se-being the true object of interest and acclaim? Are performances treated as way stations in a total reception history, sonic inscriptions of the work's meaning over historical time? Adopting more generous terms, has a performance or staging been a goad to probe assumptions about the work's meaning, suggest others, with the work of course still ineradicable from the calculus? Werktreue as an ideal, never presupposing one ideal performance, means that every actual performance is nonetheless measured against a monument whose nonmateriality says nothing about its capacity to inspire awe (Beethoven's fourth piano concerto, Don Carlos, the Schumann piano quintet, La Merone need only say or write the words). Perhaps, as Lydia Goehr has noted, contemplating musical performance beyond the immortal work means understanding a performance simultaneously as an exemplification of the work and as theater, an act in which an "expression of spontaneity, immediacy, and freedom, of feeling and breathing, of conviction and commitment" is conveyed by mute actor-musicians.'3 Musical performance, as Elisabeth LeGuin puts it, is always also a performance of sensibility.14 An escape from Kerman's utopia would mean turning away from musical works as abstractions to be scrutinized for supra-audible meanings, or saluted in prose descriptions, and turning towards events. Because all those who are "parties to the classical music esthetic," according to Richard Taruskin, "have been imbued with loyalty to the notion of the 'musical work,'" it could be a form of infidelity.'5 But this escape may be an impossibility contingent upon not turning performances or performers into yet another captured text to be examined for import via a performance science. Jankelevitch's distinction between drastic and gnostic involves more than a conventional opposition between music in practice and music in theory 13 . Goehr, The Questfor Voice, p. 148. 14. See LeGuin, "'One Says That One Weeps, but One Does Not Weep,'" pp. 209-12. 15. Taruskin, "Last Thoughts First," Text and Act, p. 11.
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Carolyn Abbate / Music-Drastic or Gnostic? because drastic connotes physicality, but also desperation and peril, involving a category of knowledge that flows from drastic actions or experiences and not from verbally mediated reasoning. Gnostic as its antithesis implies not just knowledge per se but making the opaque transparent, knowledge based on semiosis and disclosed secrets, reserved for the elite and hidden from others. Jankdlvitch explored this distinction decades before it became a commonplace in writings that describe performance as a "site of resistance to text" or as something so contingent upon present human bodies that it remains opaque ("B"). 16 In Janke1dvitch's terms, fixing upon actual live performances would mean embracing the drastic, a radical step. There is no a priori theoretical armor. In practical terms, it would mean avoiding the tactile monuments in music's necropolis-recordings and scores and graphic musical examples-and in the classroom this is nearly impossible. In some larger sense it might even mean falling silent, and this is difficult to accept because silence is not our business, and loquacity is our professional deformation.
Is the gnostic attitude precluded by performed music? This is a personal matter; thus it can be put to an individual test. Here is mine: on 27 November 2001, I was accompanying a singer in a lecture-recital that included Idamante's aria "Non temer, amato bene" from Mozart's Idomeneo, and this performance allowed me to play out the two attitudes as an experiment. "Non temer" is a bravura aria with fast runs for the pianist, calling for strict attention to the singer's tempi.'7 While playing, however, I decided to ask myself some distracting questions. They were along these lines: Where exactly is the Enlightenment subjectivity in these notes? Is the regime of absolute monarchy reflected exactly there, in this phrase? Does this arpeggio cannily resembl[ing] the narrative structures that gay writers and critics are exploring today"; thus music reports Schubert's homosexuality." Lawrence Kramer, describing certain rhythmic and harmonic duplications between the "Chiarina" and "Estrella" movement of Schumann's Carnaval, writes: "I will shortly propose that Carnaval sets up musical mirror relations that belong to a larger family of mirror tropes current during much of the nineteenth century."19 Yet, as long as I was dealing with real music in real time, I could not establish the metaphysical distance represented by such arguments. When real music is present, the gnostic can be introduced. Yet while playing "Non temer," the procedure having been performed, the questions became absurd, as if they were being asked at the wrong moment and place about something other than the reality at hand. What, I asked, am I actually thinking about this music? Clearing my mind, I realized that words connected to what was going on did flow in, albeit rarely, but these words had nothing to do with signification, being instead doing this really fast is fun or here comes a big jump. A musicologist for decades, having made many, many statements about music's meaning over that time, I acknowledged that during the experience of real music-by this I mean both playing and listening-thoughts about what music signifies or about its formal features do not cross my mind. They can cross it, as in this forced test case, only to be dismissed as ludicrous. While musicology's business involves reflecting upon musical works, describing their configurations either in technical terms or as signs, this is, I decided, almost impossible and generally uninteresting as long as real music is present-while one is caught up in its temporal wake and its physical demands or effects.
There are differences between listening and performing that should not be ignored; the former hardly involves the same responsibilities and anxieties as the latter. One can more readily depart mentally from hearing music than from performing it, though mulling over the bank balance while your hands continue the sonata by themselves is not unheard of. But that, perhaps, is the point: to reflect, must one in some sense depart? Split a drastic self from a gnostic self?20 Admitting the schism is certainly preferable to nobly overcome, to leftovers beyond this imposed limit. Faith in specificity and legibility means believing that musical artifacts at later points can be read for exact localizable traces, that once upon a time something left a mark, and that reading such traces for the facts they reflect accesses the proper meaning that one should attach to musical sounds. Only in its crudest forms does hermeneutics treat music as strictly analogous to discursive language or musical works as tantamount to other art forms and minimize the differences. To claim that musical configurations express or paint was common coin in Europe in the eighteenth century, when doctrines of mimesis and representation governed aesthetic production. To say the same thing now, however, without any historical awareness, as Janet Wolff does in writing that music does not present "special problems" as a decodable representational language, is not just quaint.25 It shows that contemporary music-hermeneutic writings can present their faith as a truth that terminates history by deeming it wrong, permanently false to think, for instance, that musical works are neither ciphered media nor decipherable text or that music's beauty is an aspect of its humane value. Yet the forms assumed by hermeneutic faith are culturally and historically contingent and, because the historical pendulum of musical aesthetics has swung between embracing mimesis and barricading music from signification, this motion, this state of unrest, should tell us that music presents some very "special problems." Precisely because music presents special problems, not least of which is live aural presence, it remains philosophically engrossing.
Musical hermeneutics right now is culturally contingent, for instance, in the sense that it could be seen as one minor byproduct of classical music's slow-motion death in the twentieth century. To the very degree that musical hermeneutics is promulgated as growth hormone, something that can revive the classical music industry, its consequence upon classical music's moribund status is made more evident. Classical music, packaged as a transparent social text, will no longer seem a pernicious object that encourages detachment from the world. Realizing this, buyers will be enticed to the cash 26. Kramer, reacting to formalist Charles Rosen, writes that there is no "permanent separation between what is musical and what is cultural or historical," that "denying music discursive meaning mystifies rather than enhances it," and that "this attitude has increasingly encouraged people to believe that classical music has nothing to say to them" (Kramer, letter to the editor, New York Review ofBooks, 22 Sept. 1994, p. 75). Cusick wrote along similar lines that we are faced with the "dissolution of musicology as a discipline" due to a "global crisis of authority" and waning appreciation of high-art music in the U.S., but that fresh attention to music's social implications runs deep within the nostalgia that would bring back, in some new form, the lost delights of a bourgeois era when this now-ossified and marginal repertory was still alive and nearer the center. The aggrandizement of academic musicology, imagined as a major player in the music industry, is painful to behold. What would executives at Sony Classical say? Fresh audiences for opera and classical music will not be conjured up via disciplinary upheavals in elite universities. If they can be conjured up at all at this point, it will be as a fringe benefit of things like the Three Tenors or Andrea Bocelli-middling singer, avid horseman, and tireless recording artist.
Claims for Leaving things open is in fact difficult to do in practice without compromise or backpedaling. For Jankelvitch, music unleashes potential meanings in high multiples, and its promise is that of a "vast future that has been given to us" (MI, p. 72). Music, he writes, has "broad shoulders" to bear whatever specific meaning we ascribe to it and "will [never] give us the lie" (MI, p. 11). Jankd16vitch defines music's ineffability (for some, an uncomfortable word) at times rather neutrally as music's indeterminacy, its mutability when submitted for contemplation, its range of effects, which include seeming to be strange or beautiful noise as well as firing up social or poetic or visual or other associations. It is this that frees us. In what sense? Any argument that discovers legible meanings or significations within music is granting music certain grandiose powers. Ironically, music is granted these powers at the very moment that it is delimited, perhaps as compensation for captivity. Behind every hermeneutic act is a sense that when musical configurations are said to carry messages or express cultural facts or release a specific association or construct a particular subjectivity, these become more authoritative-more signally important, more persuasive-than the same cultural facts or associations or constructed objects as conveyed or released by any other media. When I wrote of The Magic Flute, "[Mozart's music] imagines what the stage drama does not: the possibility of a nocturnal sun," I was trying to guarantee that the "nocturnal sun" idea (doubts about Enlightenment) would be convincing (ISO, p. 103). And saying that the idea was there in music and not the happy-end libretto ensures just that. Such logic depends on what could be called an opera or soundtrack gambit. Music is being used in exactly the same way as operatic music and film music in operas and films themselves. Music's correspondence to, or relationship with, certain words or ideas or images takes things that might in themselves seem unremarkable (whether doubts about En-lightenment or Gene Tierney walking on the beach in The Ghost and Mrs. Muir) and, by decking them out with acoustic aura and sonic gift wrapin the case of the hermeneutic argument, by locating them within musicmaking them less banal than they are by themselves. The ordinary becomes a revelation.
Ascribing revelatory force to music is a legacy from nineteenth-century musical aesthetics, but it found one outlet in twentieth-century psychoanalytic theories, which wholeheartedly embrace romanticism's hypostatization of musical sounds, paradoxically seen as at once transcendent (therefore all-powerful) and nicely decodable. Perhaps this tack is so familiar that noting how its opera gambit works will seem unnecessary, but marking its clandestine mysticism is nonetheless still worthwhile. This is, for instance, the path Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe follows when, after identifying a preference in "theory of the subject" for visual metaphors and mirrors, he challenges such preferences by addressing the "hither side" of the subject. This implicitly deeper, more a priori "side" to subjectivity expresses itself in acoustic metaphors; it is the "pre-specular" domain to which music belongs.27 Nietzsche, who spoke of listening to language "'with the third ear,'" of getting to the fundamental musicality of language and what is above or below words, is progenitor to what in psychoanalysis becomes the sound of the unconscious. And a good analyst listens transverbally, for the phonic or musical element in the analysand's speech and narratives reveals the "substructures of the soul."28 Lacoue-Labarthe carefully lays out this genealogy without becoming all that suspicious about the way in which music has been exploited in arguments that have dubious "substructures" to spare. Because the musical element is so open to interpretation, so unable to contest whatever supra-audible import it is assigned, conceptions about the psychic ill drawn from outside the musical domain become what the music is saying or revealing.
But specifying the exact revelation made by music and bringing musical configurations into concord with the social world can assume many different guises. In the case of Richard Wagner, a belief in legible correspondences between works of music and the cultural phenomena they encode and expose is the basis for his most notorious political essay, "Judaism in Music" quality," but this does not go far enough.29 Implicit in his example is the radical point that while one can distinguish devils from angels based on liking or loathing the social conclusions they have drawn out of musical works, the hermeneutic process is the same on both sides. Neither the process nor the global conviction about musical legibility it supports can separate the scurrilous or low quality answer from the acceptable answer.
To juxtapose an argument on the side of the angels with Wagner's is hardly to discount a multitude of differences, but rather to put pressure on the hermeneutic process per se. Taruskin has written that Stravinsky's music is the sonic trace of a "stripdown" from humanism to biologism in early The question is not whether the culture-to-music highway runs straight and true or whether the argument is suasive or the documentation overwhelming. What interests me is once more a sense that the historical patterns (the emergence of fascist states) and cultural force fields (biologism and utopianism) and biographical data (Stravinsky's anti-Semitism) will seem less mundane and more securely affirmed when music is seen to express them. Again, the point is not that musical works are being explained as reflecting cultural values or biographical facts. It is not even that musical works are being said to reveal something inaccessible, some social truth not conveyed by any other medium, though this is an idea well worth scrutinizing in greater detail. The point is that these ideas and truths are being made monumental and given aura by music.
Mysticism incognito, apart from that phrase about music's "primary role" in delivering ideas, appears in a preparatory reference to the unconscious. Taruskin writes, "Composers were responding to circumstances that, one can only presume, lay below the threshold of their conscious intending."31 Freudian romanticism? The political circumstances speak directly through the unconscious to the musical imagination, which conceives these circumstances in sound and gets the hand to inscribe the staff paper. Associating music with the unconscious has that rich history, and associating the unconscious with occulted truth an even richer one. At issue, however, is not even the psychoanalytic moment in the argument. That is a specific instance of the generic norm, the implication that music knows best. This same assumption can be found in Greil Marcus's account of rock music, Lipstick Traces, subtitled A Secret History of the Twentieth Centuryin music, of course, though this history, were it not being discovered in disguise as musical sound, would seem less remarkable.32 Gary Tomlinson fundamentally relies on music as mysterium, for mystery is the very thing that makes the cultural facts and processes that music is said to inscribe or release (therein becoming a nonmystery) seem so savory and interesting. Music's ineffability-its broad shoulder-is relied upon so thoroughly and yet denied any value and even denied existence. This is the mysticism that will demonize mystery at every turn.35
Juxtaposing the politically infamous Wagner with liberal academia in the here and now does not suggest that the differences are not obvious or do not matter. Not every writer who makes music speak a supra-audible message is doing so to harm or to mock, and it could well be argued that there is an insuperable species difference between scrupulous documentation and mere assertion. If clandestine mysticism is hermeneutics' involuntary reaction to music as performed, then even if it does involve illicit relocations into the metaphysical or unexamined convictions that music holds the highest cards, it nonetheless has that sympathetic point of origin. But I am convinced that as long as the genealogies are underplayed and embarrassing , 1989) , pp. 8-9] ancestors put aside, all those fantasies about racial essence embodied in music or the romanticism that genuflects whenever music "speaks," as long as its mysticism is unacknowledged, then musical hermeneutics is being practiced on quicksand. Conjuring authority out of beautiful noise involves a ruse, and giving music the capacity to convey the best truth remains a romantic cliche and need not be accepted at face value. For instance, it would be rare to find an opera analysis that does not treat music as a sign or expressive bolus whose decoded significance, understood as going beyond libretto or drama, serves in turn to determine their sense. To cite Katherine Bergeron's discussion of "clues" in Debussy's music for Pelleas et Mdlisande, which "solve the problem" of M6lisande's character, is to allude to an elegant example of a pervasive assumption that can assume inelegant forms.36 But this is the opera gambit right at the source, and musical statements arise in less enticing ways. When the Countess pardons the Count in act 4 of The Marriage of Figaro, it is not that Mozart's music simultaneously gives voice to some more profound statement of or about forgiveness. Rather, it is the fact that there is a Countess, a Count, a specific dramatic situation, and ordinary words like "Contessa, perdono" sung out loud that has in quite precise ways predetermined the meaning to attach to Mozart's musical moment. These mundane, visible things feed a conviction that transfigured forgiveness-that specifically-is being conveyed by some very beautiful noise. Hermeneutic faith does not arise in a vacuum, and just as its clandestine mysticism has roots in romantic ideologies musical hermeneutics per se has roots in operatic aesthetics. In that opera both prescribes and affirms music's emotional power and signifying capacity by attaching musical gestures to specific human situations or passions, it might be seen as a very effective means to ground musical sound in sensible discursive realities.
In Analysing Musical Multimedia, Cook puts this point differently: there is no classical musical work that is not inevitably a coproduct, allied to an album cover, or a particular concert and the experience, the situation in which we hear it, to a TV commercial, an image track.37 These cannot be winnowed away. But it is necessary to go further, and not just for the purpose of remarking that media are not transparent and that multimedia should not imply some neutral assemblage of music plus other arts, as if, once more, the delivery systems were unimportant. Beyond opera, contemporary media refresh the old operatic idea that supra-audible others shim- Standing back from all genuflecting, one might say that music is stickier and less important than the romantics-including the many still with uswant to imagine. It is at once ineffable and sticky; that is its fundamental incongruity. Words stick to it, as anyone who has tried to get the "lyrics" for Schubert's Unfinished Symphony out of his head knows all too well.
Images and corporeal gestures stick as well. Thus claims for music's absoluteness or autonomy, which recur throughout the history of musical aes-thetics, deny our oculocentric and logocentric nature, deny that physical grounding and visual symbolism and verbal content change musical sounds by recommending how they are to be understood. This capacity is exploited by film music composers writing or employing so-called anempathic music, which can depend upon the image field's ability to make sound ironic, to write over the mood or significance that the music suggests on its own. During the torture scenes in Liliana Cavani's The Night Porter (1974), Magic Flute is being played on a gramophone. The images are not just antithetical to Mozart's beautiful music or to Magic Flute's enlightened sentiments. They corrupt the music, and will continue to do so long after the movie is over, because the beautiful music cannot assuage or erase the violence we see, and the violence, in memory, becomes a part of the music. Such phenomena undermine romantic notions about music's overriding force, seen as the power to do more than the verbal and the visible, convey something beyond them, to transcend and survive their limits. The unromantic view would be that music exists in a state of unresolved and subservient alterity in relation to the visible world, or to language and words, as it does to culture or society.
But mysticism vis-a-vis music manifests itself in direct ways, and the clandestine aspect can evaporate almost entirely. Suppose music really does know best ("the matrix of sounds explains the structures of power") and gives access to otherwise lost information, revelations about humankind or its societies that no other art can transmit. Suppose music has important secrets pouring from it and our enigma machine with the correct cylinder merely needs to be put in place; that is a tempting vision.
So tempting, in fact, that it deserves a name: musical works induce the cryptographic sublime. The more impenetrable or complex the mechanism by which it is assumed something important has been encoded by a medium, the deeper the fascination commanded by that medium becomes and the stronger the emotional and erotic charges it exerts.39 Either you "drink in the cryptogram" and suspend desire (MI, p. 151), or, because disclosing secrets is a potent gesture, you give in and proceed as usual. Following upon this pasticcio any boxed assortment will seem bland: McClary's "means of deciphering socio-political agendas in apparently self-contained music" (praising Attali);43 Rose Subotnik's "Chopin's oeuvre itself was ... an extreme in which the cultural values at work can be most clearly deciphered";44 Richard Dellamora and Daniel Fischlin on opera that "encodes homosociality and homosexuality" through its "musical signifiers";45 or Raymond Knapp writing with approval about birdcalls in the Pastoral Symphony as "cryptic" prophecies that have been "partly deciphered."46 There are the distinct verbal signatures produced by clandestine mysticism-music reveals things "below... conscious intending" ("0," p. xxxi), "deeply hidden things," "secrets," "genuine social knowledge."47 Words like code and cryptogram and decipher usher this chthonic discourse into broad daylight because hieroglyphs are at once material objects visible to the naked eye and the enigma these objects promise so persuasively as a hidden secret beyond their surface. But the words are objectivist set dressing that occlude the mysticism they nonetheless help conjure into being. Perhaps subjectivity arises when one "decipher [s]" oneself as an amalgam of recognized knowledge.48 Yet as Roland Barthes put it, decipherers and disentanglers belong to very different subject species, one wishing for an end, the other tolerant of impermanence, even nescience.49 And thus the notes that Adorno acknowledges music as something "distinctly mystical" while "at the same time, it is a concrete, material practice," stressing Adorno's point that "music is not constituted by a sign system" but a syntactical one. Again and again, as Leppart indicates, Adorno must reconcile his belief in music as cryptogram (which implies signification, in that musical gestures, syntax, forms, or procedures reference their supra-audible social truths and reveal them) with his knowledge of music's indeterminacy and its differences from language (Leppart, distinction between low and soft hermeneutics disappears. Soft hermeneutics makes disclaimers, acknowledges epistemological limitations, or repeats the truism that meaning is produced by and within the subject and is not immanent in the object and is thus variable and contingent. But-and this cannot be overstressed-the decipherer's habit is ineradicable from musical hermeneutics. Neither dialectical foreplay, nor the soft caveat that, as Kramer puts it, "meaning is not the cause of the interpretation, but its effect" or that "what is objectively 'present' in the work ... is not a specific meaning but the availability or potentiality of meanings," can compensate for statements wherein a specific import is indeed ascribed to some aspect of or configuration within the work, in acts of academic authority (MM, p. 118). In other words, you cannot hide the nature of the hermeneutic act, no matter how eloquent and well-meant your framing disclaimers. It is built into the very bone, into the moment when the notes are said to be something other (a "nocturnal sun," perhaps?). One could say it is built into the business, untranscendable, and one must decide whether to make peace with that or not.
Musical hermeneutics' specifically technological swerve, its embrace of codes and mechanisms, has a mixed ancestry based partly in linguistics and in jargon like semiotic code. Historically, however, the move from musical hermeneutics as silly frivolity or alluring jeu d'esprit (as in the nineteenth century) to musical hermeneutics with laboratory standards should once again be credited to Adorno.50 Janke1evitch, sardonically, imagines the hermeneutical stethoscope, a scientific instrument to be placed on a musical work in the right place in order to hear important information. But when (in 1928) Adorno described Schubert's music as a seismograph, an exemplary move was made towards the technomysticism that is now commonplace.5' That technology, codes, inscription metaphors, and mechanisms flow into musical hermeneutics is not, however, just an entertaining foible. nearly inaudible sound into louder sound, without crossover from one medium or phenomenon into another. What was sound remains sound, just closer or more clearly heard. Seismographs measure earthquakes, yet also record the earth's murmured groans and imperceptible shifts below the threshold of perception with acuity that far outdoes the human senses. But more than this, their product-the trace they leave on paper, the product perceptible to our senses-is no amplification or direct transportation, not simply motion for motion. The product is motion translated into another medium: graphic inscriptions on paper that will remain abstract or illegible as long as they are taken as themselves. This is what makes the metaphor so good. In any music-sociological project, music's lines or contours, the sounds that remain inscrutable in mere material-acoustic form, are thus declared to be the incorruptible recording medium for some other. With the seismograph, a strong symbolic nexus goes to work; seismograph equals below, buried, underground, tectonic vastness, the danse macabre of archeological time, inscribed as if by magic, and legible to privileged eyes only. Such notions resonate across several decades and academic cultures with structuralist or Foucauldian givens that what is least transparent to individual consciousness, least intended or calculated, is both most important about a given cultural or historical biosphere and most likely to leave fingerprints on cultural artifacts.
The allure of measuring devices is that they tell the truth without human bias; saying that music is them (or is like them) implies that music is a measuring device, too, and from there it is a short leap to reading it for results. Adorno anticipates this fault, the fault of seeming definitive, saying though music is a seismograph, the cipher it places before our eyes cannot yet be read because our eyes are still flooded by the tears it has inspired.52 Because his oeuvre is rich in decryptions of musical texts, the belletristic legerdemain may seem either irritating or scrupulously honest. There is a subversive note sounded nonetheless: what if music were a machine, but one whose mechanism and products remain permanently inscrutable? That Adorno makes the flanking move, citing the still-incapable eye, is at once a symptom of his reservations about the music-sociological project's premises or potential weakness and a preemptive strike from his Judaic side, which rejects vulgar representation and embraces technomysticism as antidote.
Why all the machines? Why the repressive and exclusionary regime of the secret? The gnostic habit aims to expose something imperceptible to the 52. See ibid., p. 33, translation mine: "In irregular jerks, like a seismograph, Schubert's music transcribes a qualitative change in humankind ... we cannot read it, but it sets ciphers of the reconciliation that will finally come before our failing, tear-filled eyes." And this less obvious benefit returns us to the initial quandary: where are material presence and carnality, where has live performance gone, when it produced our love for music to begin with? One answer is that technological images act as their surrogates. According to Jean-Frangois Lyotard, techne-the action and labor of machines, the material reality implicit in technology, and the temporality attached to that action-carries implications of concreteness, physicality, and embodiment.54 When hermeneutics invokes technology, it reaps those implications of physicality and labor as diversions from its concern with bodiless musical works whose mute value lies in their social or cultural import. Music induces the cryptographic sublime. But reacting to that sublimity by rushing to technological metaphors means relying on false Eros and synthetic carnality for persuasive impact.
The carnal and the material are, it would seem, immensely desirable, even in their displaced form as mechanisms and inscription machines. Yet the carnal and material in their evident and common form, as actual live performances, seem somehow too hot to handle. Music in performance affects us physically, but, as Jankdlvitch points out, its physical action can engender spiritual conditions, grace, humility, reticence. Anyone with allergies to words like spiritual will reject this point like a bad transfusion. For Jankdlvitch, however, the relationship between real music and its action upon performers and listeners-at a nonrepeatable moment and place, in a context that will exist only once and not again-becomes so fundamental, so viscerally powerful and ephemeral, so personal, contingent, fugitive to understanding, that it elicits the unfashionable. Embarrassing reversions may be necessary, to Neoplatonic philosophy, for instance, or its stepchild, One can react to performed music not just by imagining machines or mechanical processes as forms of explanation but by translating the relationship between sounds and performer or listener into safe forms, as connections between the musical notes and human facts: sexuality, subjectivity, the body, political faiths, cultural habits. The heat added when the human factor is adduced masks a sanitizing impulse in the enterprise, but to point this out does not mean that the impulse to retreat or translate is without appeal. But it does indicate that, in the case of music, formalism (music theory and analysis) and hermeneutics should not be glaring at each other because they are twins.55 Formalism and hermeneutics are not simply two celestial bodies occupying an otherwise empty discursive universe. Rather, their trajectories have been determined by a powerful object, the antagonist visible in the very distortions its presence has engendered. This antagonist is performed music's action, as opposed to an abstract musical work's formal shapes or representational implications.
Moreover, music theory and formal analysis, while they have solid merits, do not get at what used to be called the music itself, though this has been both touted as their advantage and condemned as their flaw. On the condemning side, Ruth Solie argues that formalism's affection for technical musical detail among other things pays homage to immediacy as an intellectual placeholder for an unmediated musical experience, which, one could imagine, is tantamount to a performance. And immediacy as a category is to be suspected because it can become a pretext for excluding certain political understandings of music.56 One can fully agree with her diagnosis of 55. A synthesis between the two attitudes can be arranged, as it has been by Taruskin, who relies "on close technical analysis precisely because hermeneutics and musical analysis have so often and so complacently been declared, from both sides of the presumed divide, to be antagonistic" ("0," p. xxx). The synthesis is smooth because the attitudes are not antithetical, and it is logical that they marry in a global explication de texte. Adopting a deconstructive apparatus and scoffing at presence like a man can truly seem perverse when real music is at issue. Unlike another aural phenomena-language or literature in oral form-real music does not propose a "simultaneity of sound and sense" that in thus positing a signifier and signified can itself be "convincingly deconstruct [ed] ."7 Real music is a temporal event with material presence that can be held by no hand. So why assume that musical sound made in time by the labor of performance is well served by recourse to a philosophical tradition that indeed deconstructs presence, but does so easily because it traffics exclusively in metaphysical objects? This is not to say that metaphysics has no relevance to music as a philosophical concept. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht has nonetheless pointed out that phenomena that are events may not be particularly susceptible to a philosophical tradition in which the metaphysics of the subject or insights of Saussurean linguistics are basic sustenance. For such phenomena, philosophies of action, labor, and techne, as he puts it (elaborating upon Jean-Luc Nancy), and a critical discourse accounting for the "movement, immediacy, and violence" in events being "born to presence" prove more fertile.58 What Gumbrecht calls meaning culture and presence culture do not gain legitimacy by excluding each other. One of them is perpetually in danger of appearing illegitimate in the academy-presence culture. Yet meaning culture-scholarship's privileged culture-is inadequate to deal with certain aesthetic phenomena, events like performed music in particular. If immediate aural presence has gotten some votes of no confidence in contemporary musicological discourse, this may reflect unspoken uneasiness about performed music as an ephemeral object, subject to instantaneous loss, but equally importantly as something that acts upon us and changes us. When it is present, it can ban logos or move our bodies without our conscious will. This uneasiness leads to what Jankel"vitch calls "bearing a grudge against music," the intellectual's grudge par excellence (MI, p. 7). For him, this is the grudge of false moralists, reflecting certain antihedonist pathologies. This grudge rejects the idea that forces unleashed in performance count more than immortal works and the elaborate readings or formal descriptions that musicology assigns such abstractions. Prescribing a critical distance from the performance experience, ever since Brechtian estrangement, has seemed to guarantee liberal credentials. Yet this can foreclose much that is of value, both intellectually and morally, in encountering a present other at point-blank range.
Thus general suspicions of aural presence need themselves to be resisted. Presence can be demonized for reasons that seem programmed, for not all those who argue for its worth are vulgar. And reflexive scorn for music's ineffability is equally contestable. Ignoring real music-the musical eventand scorning ineffability go hand in hand because they are interdependent. It is real music, music-as-performed, that engenders physical and spiritual conditions wherein sound might suggest multiple concrete meanings and associations, conflicting and interchangeable ones, or also none at all, doing something else entirely. Real music, the event itself, in encouraging or demanding the drastic, is what damps down the gnostic. And some florid antiarias to gnostic proscriptions against the drastic attitude are very much in order. Freeing oneself from the "devastating hegemony of the word" in experiencing performed music does not mean that the human subject has lapsed into sensual idiocy (MI, p. 140). Aesthetic pleasure, the apprehension of beauty, is not evil, nor is it just a hedonist consolation.59 Doubting that musical works spell out cultural data or simply mulling over the mysticism inherent in arguments that they do is not naturally appalling. Musical hermeneutics' most coercive aspect is exemplified in claims that acknowledging or valuing music's ineffability constitute, as Kramer has put it, a "destructive 59. In On Beauty and Being Just (Princeton, N.J., 1999), Elaine Scarry writes, "The banishing of beauty from the humanities in the last two decades has been carried out by a set of political complaints against it. But ... these political complaints against beauty are themselves incoherent" (p. 57). Beauty neither makes us inattentive towards injustice (because, far from distracting us from the phenomenal world, it makes us more aware), nor, in being stared at, or listened to, does it wreak damage either upon the beautiful object or the individual who apprehends it; see ibid., pp. 58-68. irrationalism" typical of those who "justify unspeakable things" (MM, p. 5). Note the slippage, which must not go unrebuked. Somehow, philosophers like Stanley Cavell, Lydia Goehr, and Naomi Cumming, who suggest (echoing Jankelevitch) that music's implications proliferate against discipline, or who point to performed music's presence as a promise of life, are suddenly out there with unnamed villains and unspeakable historical crimes.60 So, after being given pause, why not take intellectual pleasure from music not as a work but as an event? Why not disentangle some virtues from a situation wherein the words explaining music are these: doing this really fast is fun. Between the score as a script, the musical work as a virtual construct, and us, there lies a huge phenomenal explosion, a performance that demands effort and expense and recruits human participants, takes up time, and leaves people drained or tired or elated or relieved. Philosophical treatises, the Bible, novels, memoirs, paintings, poems, these texts (and even plays, consumed on paper) lack that really big middle term, that elephant in the room. Any argument that throws music's exceptional phenomenal existence into some convenient oubliette in order to get over distinctions and difficulties is made in bad faith.
Would attending to performances entirely damp down the gnostic, as my performance of the aria from Idomeneo seemed to suggest? No. The experience of musical performance is generous, above all in opera or music theater (indeed, all sung music), where verbal and visual aspects furnish a simultaneous ground under the sonic circus, the ground where these other strata shape one's sense of a music that cannot be detached from them. We so often deal hermeneutically with the past and its artifacts, yet seldom do we reflect upon artifacts we have right now and what they will mean in the future. Here is a chance. Will some audience years hence see a pirate videotape of Happiness and hear the sound and, without the secret, find themselves perplexed? And, even if some spectator were told by a musicologist of the future what the historical reading of the sound should be, would he or she find that knowing no longer means what it did in 2002? That knowing means loss of the perhaps equally terrible aura the sound now engenders only as long as it remains undefined? The very fact ofrecordingas any future audience can experience this event that came into presence (to echo Gumbrecht) only via its repeatable surrogate-does that not alter a basic alchemy, making the event an artifact, handheld and under control, encouraging distance and reflection? Gnostic satisfactions can become pale. What may be left in Laurie Anderson's recorded sound is a remnant whose force approaches the force once predicated on a rare amalgam-live presence and secret knowledge-but do so precisely because the secret knowledge has been lost, as has what was once alive. To believe that original signification can become quasi-permanent, or to value nondetermination for the freedom that allows alternatives to arise and to exist? That is the choice when confronting artifacts from the past as well, and perhaps that choice depends on which loss is regretted more deeply.
Music's cryptographic sublimity is a contributing force in the clandestine mysticism that appears as a bystander in musical hermeneutics, just as music's ineffability is what allows musical hermeneutics to exist. Music is ineffable in allowing multiple potential meanings and demanding none in particular, above all in its material form as real music, the social event that has carnal effects. The state engendered by real music, the drastic state, is unintellectual and common, familiar in performers and music lovers and annoying nonmusicologists, and it has value. When we cannot stare such embarrassing possibilities in the face and find some sympathy for them, when we deny that certain events or states are impenetrable to gnostic habits, hence make them invisible and inaudible, we are vulnerable. For, denying mystery, the perplexing event, the reticence such things may 61. See 9/11, DVD, dir. Jules and Ged6on Naudet (Paramount, 2002). engender, means being prey to something that comes to call at its nocturnal worst, as coercive mysticism and morbid grandiloquence.
Words like "coercive mysticism and morbid grandiloquence" do bring
